|
|

DIRECTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
by Saruhan Hatipoglu
sshatipoglu@beri.com
AMERICA’S GREATEST EXPORT: THE US$
The US$ Tsunami.
The world is awash in US$s. In 2004 the current account (goods, services,
income, and transfers) deficit increased to US$665.94 billion from US$530.67
billion in 2003. One result of this growing imbalance is the enormous foreign
exchange reserves held by such countries as China, India, Japan, Russia, and
some others. Another result is the plunge in the value of the US$. Trading in
many commodities, including crude oil and natural gas, is denominated in US$s
and, therefore, price increases have been less severe in importing countries
with strong currencies relative to the US$. In a way, policies in Washington,
D.C. have permitted the importers to purchase key items and pay for them in US$s
earned from Americans. This description pertains to legal transactions, but
when US$s accumulated in recent years from drug trafficking, organized crime
transactions, and other illegal activities are considered, the dollar tsunami is
in potentially massive levels.
Financing the U.S. Current Account
Deficit.
In the Clinton years before the Bush administration, the shortfall was managed
easily by foreign purchases of American securities. The federal budget had
been converted to surpluses, the US$ was stable and risks about loss of capital
were low. A financial and fiscal environment had been created that
permitted the US$ to be recycled, flowing out through the current account and
returning through the capital account.
The question is: if you are an investor from another
country today, would you buy American securities in 2005? Many people are
concerned about converting their currencies to US$s at the current exchange
rates because the probability of a €1.00=US$1.50 rate in the future is high.
Capital gains in local currency are unlikely during the next four years. This
means that the risk premium on yields has to be substantial. On 1 April 2005,
the prime interest rate was 5.75%, up 44% from 4.00% a year earlier. The
average one-year CD rate was 3.25%, 90% higher than 1.71% twelve months before.
The higher interest rates are currently sufficient to attract some foreign
investors to US$ securities but not enough. And, the relative attractiveness is
declining steadily.
Managing Foreign
Exchange Reserves.
Central banks have traditionally held a large proportion of these reserves in US$s. However, policies and priorities in the second Bush administration term
have caused concern about the future value of the US$. Rumors have begun about
central bankers selling the American currency and buying euros. If the
portfolio switch becomes a proven fact in 2-3 cases, the possibility of a run on
the US$ becomes a real threat. This would be a serious challenge to the global
financial system, which is currently not able to absorb such a serious blow.
The possibility of such a catastrophe has acted as a restraint in central bank
decision making.
US$ Billion
Foreign Exchange Reserves Held By:
End-2003 End-2004
China
403.251 640.857
India
87.213 129.009
Japan
652.790 821.203
Korea
154.509 198.822
Russia
73.172 121.166
These five countries are an indication of the gains
during 2004. Total global foreign exchange reserves topped US$3.5 trillion last
year, and almost 60% of this amount is held by top seven Asian central banks.
This catapults the region and its central bank policies to the forefront.
Central banks do not engage in speculation, but if the funds remain in US$s, the
losses in euros and other strong currencies could be substantial.
Trading patterns will guide some of the decisions, and the volume of purchases
denominated in US$s will also be a factor. It is probable that a shift to
euros will take place slowly in 2005 to prevent a run on the US$. After
all, a sudden shift will hurt government investment in U.S. Treasuries for many
of these countries, particularly China and Japan (the two countries have over
40% of total global reserves). Both China and Japan are concerned about their
currencies, and a sudden shift away from the US$ will put upward pressure on the
renminbi and the yen. This is the main reason BERI forecasts a
gradual shift in composition of reserves.
Interest Rates, Inflation, and the
Current Account Deficit.
Americans are predicting higher interest rates because of inflationary pressures
created by US$55/barrel crude oil and demand-pull factors. This is a
narrow viewpoint. The Federal Reserve and the Bush administration should
be aggressively defending the US$ by raising interest rates more rapidly,
rendering American securities more attractive, and making the cost of goods and
services, domestic and foreign, less attractive. It is not overheating of
the economy, or even signs of inflation, that makes significantly higher
interest rates necessary. What requires deliberate action is the weak US$
and the threat to the global economy caused by the dollar tsunami. It is
this combination that is likely to create a much-feared recession for the U.S.
Washington, D.C., is currently resisting calls to put a brake on demand,
especially with sharply higher interest rates. The impact of sharp hikes on the
federal budget deficit would be sufficient to force the politicians to make
spending cuts, an option not attractive to the Bush administration and his loyal
Republican Congress, some of whom will face elections next year. Slower growth
is painful for politics, but a recession is lethal. The disequilibrium caused
by large current account and budget deficits and a depreciating currency could
cause severe economic deceleration. Fix it now. Do not tease it with
measured interest rate hikes. If not addressed appropriately, the outcome
will be a chaotic global financial environment.
DIRECTOR'S PERSPECTIVE Last Updated May 7
|
|